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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At page five through eight of the Appellant's Opening Brief, the appellant explains in detail the 
appellant's version of the history of this case. However, the appellant fails to ever cite to the record 
on appeal for support of the statements made at pages five through eight. Therefore, the respondent 
does not have sufficient notice to respond to the statements made at pages five through eight of 
the Appellant's Opening Brief. The respondent objects to the entirety of statements made at pages 
five through eight as unsupported and irrelevant to the issue on appeal of attorney's fees. The 
respondent's relevant statement of facts, which is supported by the record, is provided below. 
On December 13, 2013, a Complaint was filed with the trial court naming the plaintiff as "Victoria 
H. Smith, by and through her attorney in fact, Vernon K. Smith, by and through his Durable and 
Irrevocable Power of Attorney" ("deceased" hereafter) and naming the defendants as "Treasure 
Valley Seed Company, LLC, and Don Tolmie in his individual capacity, and as an owner, 
representative and authorized agent of Treasure Valley Seed Co., LLC" ("TVC" hereafter). R. p. 
5-14. During a telephone conference on March 3, 2014, the trial court and counsel for TVC learned 
that the deceased had died on September 11, 2013, three months before the Complaint was filed. 
On March 18, 2014, TVC filed a motion and memorandum to dismiss the Complaint on the 
grounds that the deceased had died three months before the Complaint was filed. R. p. 143-153. 
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On April 2, 2014, a hearing was held on the motion to dismiss and the Complaint was dismissed. 
Thereafter, TV C filed a memorandum of costs seeking an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant 
to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 & 12-121 and IRCP 54(e)(l) & 1 l(a)(l). R. p. 167-168. On July 28, 
2014, a hearing was held on TVC's memorandum of costs wherein the trial court ruled, in part, as 
follows: 
[I]t is clear to me that the defendant in this case is the prevailing party. This 
Court does, in fact, have jurisdiction .... 
So I do have jurisdiction, and the defendant is clearly the prevailing party. 
The determination or [sic] prevailing party is generally held to be a discretionary 
call with the Court based upon the facts and circumstances of the case, but that 
discretion is not unbounded. And there is a case I can't cite it off the top of my 
head but there is a case that says a Court abuses its discretion when it declines to 
find a defendant is the prevailing party where the defendant has obtained the most 
relief the defendant could get, and that is dismissal of the case. 
So in this case, were I to hold there is no prevailing party, I believe the Idaho 
Supreme Court would say that I had abused my discretion. So there is a prevailing 
party. 
And, frankly, I think attorney's fees are awardable, would be awardable on 
this case under all three theories put forth. It has its origins in a commercial 
transaction; that is, looking at the pleadings in the case, underlying it is a dispute 
over the storage of beans. So the origin of the dispute is in a commercial transaction 
as contrasted to being a tort or a being a consumer transaction; that is, a transaction 
related to or a transaction for personal or household purposes. 
But more fundamentally this is a case that should never have been brought 
in the fashion that it was brought. It was not brought by the proper party. Victoria 
Smith is no longer with us. She cannot in-person or through a power of attorney be 
a party to a court action. It's just pretty much that simple and black letter law. This 
matter, if it is to be pursued on behalf of Victoria Smith upon her passing, it needs 
to be pursued by the estate of Victoria Smith. And that was never commenced, at 
least not as of the time this case was brought. And at the time is was argued, Mr. 
Eismann represents that it has not been - probate has not been started to this date. 
I don't know. That's not in my record. I don't rely on that. I look at the case as it 
was at the time it was terminated - or actually at the time it was commenced. 
This case was brought without foundation. Idaho Code Section 12-121 says 
that attorney's fees are awardable if the case is brought, pursued, or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. I won't go as far as to say the case 
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is frivolous because underlying it there appears to be a genuine dispute of some 
variety that needs to be decided at some point by a proper forum or in a proper 
forum. But it was certainly pursued in this case without foundation because there 
is no foundation for commencing a lawsuit on behalf of someone who is deceased 
other than doing it through the - as a properly-appointed personal representative or 
otherwise authorized person. And a power of attorney simply does not and cannot 
survive the death of the grantor. That's just so fundamental that it is hard to find 
even authority that says so. 
I will award the attorney's fees. The costs requested are all costs as a matter 
of right. The attorney's fees requested -- or the costs requested will be awarded. 
And I'm going to award attorney's fees in this case under Idaho Code Section 12-
121 as a lawsuit that was brought or pursued without foundation -- umeasonably 
and without foundation. 
As an alternative I would award attorney's fees under 12-120(3), although 
I do not think that reaches to counsel. I am not comfortable that the procedure 
required by Rule 11, that is, the opportunity -- the notice and opportunity to 
withdraw a pleading and get out from under the potential sanction was followed in 
this case. Or if it was and my record was clear that it was followed, so at this time 
I'm going to decline to award fees under Rule 11. But I will rule -- award them 
under 12-121 against the party and counsel because it's counsel's responsibility, 
frankly, in a case like this to know the law and follow it. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 31 L. 15 - p. 36, L. 8 
On August 28, 2014, a Judgment was entered on TVC's memorandum of costs. Counsel for TVC 
prepared and submitted the Judgment and the trial court struck out several of the provisions in the 
Judgment. The only provision left in the Judgment provided as follows: 
4. The defendants shall recover from Attorney Vernon K. Smith and the 
plaintiff,jointly and severly, the costs and attorney fees of $15,826.50 which sum 
shall bear interest from the date of this judgment until paid at the judgment rate 
fixed by Idaho Code Section 28-22-104(2) which on the date of this judgment is 
5 .125 percent per annum. 
R. p. 200. 
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On October 8, 2014, the deceased filed a Notice of Appeal. On October 23, 2014, TVC 
filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal. 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
TVC presents no additional issues on appeal. 
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS/CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRJEF - PAGE 8 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
TVC requests an award of attorney's fees against on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and 
IRCP 54(e)(l). TVC requests that counsel for the deceased be liable for the attorney's fees. 
Under Idaho Code § 12-121 and IRCP 54(e)(l), TVC requests attorney's fees as the prevailing 
party because the deceased's appeal is frivolous, umeasonable, and without foundation as 
explained at length below. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. Standard of review. 
The standard ofreview for an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-120, Idaho Code § 
12-121, and IRCP 1 l(a)(l) is the abuse of discretion standard. See Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 
980, 342 P.3d 907, 911 (2014), Idaho Military Historical Society, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 
629, 329 P.3d 1072 (2013), and Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 
87, 94, 803 P.2d 993 (1990) respectively. 
The abuse of discretion standard is a three step analysis as follows: 
2. 
12-121. 
(1) whether the trial court properly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether that court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether 
the court reached its decision by the exercise of reason. 
Maslen at 629. 
The trial court properly awarded attorney's fees to TVC pursuant to Idaho Code§ 
The trial court properly perceived the issue of an award of attorney's fees as one of discretion. The 
trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with all legal 
standards. The trial court reached its decision by the exercise of reason. 
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The deceased raises several arguments against the trial court's award of attorney's fees to TVC 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. Those arguments are addressed individually below. 
A. Whether written findings were required for attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 12-121. 
The first argument of the deceased is that the trial court failed to provide written findings 
supporting its award of attorney's fees to TV C pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, which provides 
that "[w]henever the court awards attorney fees pursuant to section 12-121, Idaho Code, it shall 
make a written finding, either in the award or in a separate document, as to the basis and reasons 
for awarding such attorney fees." Thus, TVC must admit that written findings are required for an 
award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. 
TVC requests on appeal the creation of new case law allowing an exception to the written findings 
requirement of IRCP 54( e )(2) where it is clear from the record the basis on which the trial court 
awarded attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. The proposed new rule and/or exception 
would be that the written findings requirement of IRCP 54(e)(2) is met where the trial court's 
findings are clear from the transcript of a hearing on a memorandum of costs. If the trial court's 
findings are not clear from the transcript of a hearing on a memorandum of costs, then the issue 
must be remanded to the trial court. The reason for t~e creation of new law is to avoid unnecessary 
waste of judicial time and energy in remanding an issue to the trial court. 
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In this case, the trial court extensively explained at oral argument on the memorandum of costs 
what the trial court found in relation to awarding attorney's fees to TVC pursuant to Idaho Code § 
12-121. The trial court specifically found that "I'm going to award attorney's fees in this case 
under Idaho Code Section 12-121 as a lawsuit that was brought or pursued without foundation --
unreasonably and without foundation." Tr. Vol I, p. 35, L. 15-19. The trial court spent a 
considerable amount of time explaining why this lawsuit was unreasonable and without foundation 
during other parts of the hearing as shown in the trial court's decision in the statement of facts 
section above. There appears to be no reasonable cause to remand the issue to the trial court to 
enter written findings pursuant to IRCP 54( e )(2) when it is readily apparent what the findings of 
the trial court were in awarding attorney's fees to TVC. 
If, on appeal, it is determined that IRCP 54(e)(2) is mandatory and no exception will be made 
thereto, then TVC asks that the case be remanded to the trial court for entry of written findings as 
to the basis and reasons for awarding attorney's fees to TVC pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. 
Idaho appellate court have held that where there are no written findings pursuant to IRCP 54( e )(2), 
then the case should be remanded to the trial court for the entry of written findings. See Snipes v. 
Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262 (Ct.App.1997) and Needs v. Idaho State Dept. of 
Correction at Orofino, 115 Idaho 399,401, 766 P.2d 1280 (Ct.App.1988). 
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B. Whether a person's misperception of law or of one's interest under the law, by itself, 
is unreasonable conduct pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
The second argument of the deceased is that a misperception of the law or an interest under the 
law, by itself, is not umeasonable conduct. The quirk in this issue is that Idaho case law does not 
specify whose perception is at issue - i.e. is it the party's perception or the perception of the 
attorney representing the party. That issue is particularly in play in this case because the issue of 
the deceased's perception of the law cannot be discussed because the deceased was dead when the 
Complaint was filed. Therefore, the deceased could not have misperceived anything. 
The only person left to misperceive anything at the time of filing the Complaint is opposing 
counsel, Vernon K. Smith ("Mr. Smith" hereafter). Since a misperception of law or an interest 
under the law, by itself, does not automatically rise to the level of unreasonable conduct, then the 
entire circumstance must be taken into consideration. Thus, the analysis in this case is whether Mr. 
Smith's misperception of the law or an interest under the law was unreasonable considering all of 
the circumstances surrounding this case. 
Mr. Smith's misperception of the law was unreasonable and without foundation. At the trial court 
level, Mr. Smith filed the Complaint under the theory that he had a durable and irrevocable power 
of attorney for the deceased which allowed him to act on behalf of the deceased. However, this 
argument defies the facts and the law. 
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Mr. Smith has taken several positions regarding the assets of the deceased and ownership of those 
assets. The Complaint initially showed that Mr. Smith thought he could act on the deceased' s 
behalf by way of the durable power of attorney. Then Mr. Smith argued to the trial court that he 
was the only heir of the deceased pursuant to a will. Tr. Vol. I, p. 12, L. 3 - p. 14, L. 3. Now, at 
page 8 of the deceased's opening brief on appeal, Mr. Smith admits that all of the deceased's assets 
had been previously transfe1Ted to an entity called VHS Properties, LLC. Moreover, a probate 
action has now been filed wherein the will is being challenged by Mr. Smith's brother, Joseph H. 
Smith (one of two of Mr. Smith's siblings), on the grounds that the will is the product of undue 
influence by Mr. Smith. TVC asks the appellate court to take judicial notice of probate case CV-
IE-2014-15352 in Ada County. Thus, Mr. Smith's original position in filing the Complaint under 
the theory of a durable power of attorney is simply not factual because Mr. Smith has taken so 
many contrary positions. 
Mr. Smith's position in filing the Complaint under the theory that he had a durable power of 
attorney over the deceased also defies clear law. As explained by TVC in the Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Smith's power of attorney terminated when 
the deceased died. R. p. 152. Under Idaho Code 15-12-1 lO(l)(a), a power of attorney terminated 
when the principle dies. Thus, when the deceased died on September 11, 2013, Mr. Smith's power 
of attorney terminated. However, Mr. Smith continued attempting to exercise the authority of the 
power of attorney when he filed the Complaint on December 13, 2013. 
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Given Mr. Smith's inaccurate factual allegations and his clearly unlawful use of a power of 
attorney after the deceased died, Mr. Smith's conduct can only be seen as unreasonable. Mr. Smith 
cannot credibly argue that he misperceived the facts and the law. Consequently, Mr. Smith cannot 
credibly claim that his conduct was reasonable as a simple misperception of law or an interest 
under the law. 
Aside from Mr. Smith's subjective view of whether his conduct was umeasonable, the trial court 
specifically found that Mr. Smith brought or pursued this lawsuit unreasonably and without 
foundation. The Idaho Supreme Court explained the analysis for an award of attorney's fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 as follows: 
An award of attorney fees pursuant to I. C. § 12-121 and LR. C.P. 54( e )(1) will not 
be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users 
Ass'n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237,250, 869 P.2d 554, 567 (1993). The district court's 
determination as to whether an action was brought or defended frivolously will not 
be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 
Maslen at 629. 
If a trial court's decision as to whether an action was brought frivolously will not be disturbed 
absent an abuse of discretion, then the same abuse of discretion standard should apply to whether 
an action was brought unreasonably or without foundation. Thus, when the trial court found that 
the deceased's lawsuit was brought unreasonably and without foundation, then that determination 
should only be overturned on appeal if the deceased shows the trial court abused his discretion. 
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The deceased has failed to state how the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the 
deceased's case was brought unreasonable and without foundation. 
C. Whether the entire course of litigation must be considered in an award of attorney's 
fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 so that any legitimate, triable issue of fact will prevent 
an award of attorney's fees. 
The deceased' s argument on this issue is difficult to ascertain. The deceased provides case law that 
the any legitimate triable issue will negate an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 
12-121, but the deceased never explains or identifies how the deceased presented a triable issue of 
fact. Regardless, the deceased's legal theory fails for two reasons. 
First, the Idaho Supreme Court has recently modified the strict rule that any triable issue of fact 
will prevent an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. In Maslen, the Idaho 
Supreme Court explained as follows: 
Unfortunately, the standard articulated in Nampa Meridian can lead to the result 
that a party who makes claims or defenses that are clearly frivolous, unreasonable, 
or without foundation may avoid the consequences of that conduct and cast the 
burden of attorney fees on the other party, even if the overall view of the case 
establishes the unreasonableness of the conduct requiring the lawsuit. Arguably, a 
single, triable issue of fact may excuse a party from the aggregate of misconduct 
that necessitates or dominates the conduct of the lawsuit. This Court does back 
away from and clarify the overly strict application of Idaho Code section 12-121 set 
forth in Nampa Meridian. Apportionment of attorney fees is appropriate for those 
elements of the case that were frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. 
Apportionment of costs and fees is common even for district courts, and this step 
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back from the language of Nampa J\1eridian is consistent with the general 
principles of apportioning costs and fees. 
Id. at 632. 
Thus, Idaho case law no longer holds that any triable or legitimate issue of fact will prevent the 
award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and the deceased' s legal theory fails. 
Second, even ifldaho case law still held that a legitimate triable issue of fact will prevent an award 
of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, the deceased failed to provide such legitimate 
triable issue of fact. The deceased filed the Complaint in the name of the deceased, which cannot 
be done. The deceased refuses to acknowledge that fatal error and instead asks this court to 
consider that the deceased should have been allowed to substitute in a different party. Despite the 
fact that the deceased failed to timely appeal that issue, the deceased continues to argue the issue 
of whether a substitution of parties should have been allowed by the trial court. 
On December 10, 2015, an order was entered in this case on appeal wherein the deceased was 
ordered to "file a revised brief that addresses the issue of fees only." Despite that order, the 
deceased continues to try to argue the issue of whether the trial court should have dismissed the 
Complaint. TVC objects to the deceased's continuation on this argument, but will address the issue 
regardless. 
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The trial court properly dismissed the deceased's Complaint. At the hearing on the motion to 
dismiss on April 2, 2014, the trial court discussed the problem with allowing the deceased to 
substitute another party-that it is unknown who would actually have the right to collect from 
TVC ifTVC was unsuccessful at trial. The trial court stated, "[a]nd Mr. Eismann's client is to run 
the risk -- I mean, if they -- if they actually owe money and pay it to the wrong person, they can 
be made to pay twice." Tr. Vol. I, p. 12, L. 21-24. The trial court also acknowledged that no probate 
had been filed for the deceased. In essence, the trial court was unwilling to wait around to find out 
who could be owed money by TVC. 
The trial court's decision to not allow substitution is especially sound considering that any number 
of people and/or entities could ultimately be entitled to be paid. As explained above, the potential 
parties with an interest in the proceeds (if any) of this case could be the deceased's estate, Mr. 
Smith, Mr. Smith's two siblings, or VHS Properties, LLC. It would have been extremely 
prejudicial to TVC to either wait around for conclusion of the deceased's estate or to pay one of 
the potential recipients and hope that TVC would not be required to pay a second time. 
The trial court properly considered the entire course of litigation and came to the conclusion that 
the deceased's case was unreasonable and without foundation. The deceased has shown no abuse 
of discretion on the part of the trial court and the trial court's grant of attorney's fees to TVC 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 should be upheld. 
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3. TVC withdraws its cross-appeal. 
TV C filed a cross-appeal in this action seeking recovery of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
12-120(3) and IRCP ll(a)(l), but TVC hereby withdraws that cross-appeal. The reason for the 
withdrawal is that an award of attorney's fees against the deceased would be useless at this point. 
TVC was not made aware of the filing of an estate for the deceased and thereby TVC did not file 
a claim for attorney's fees against the estate of the deceased. The time within which to make a 
claim against the estate of the deceased has run, so TVC will not pursue an award of attorney's 
fees against the estate. Moreover, depending on the outcome of litigation in the estate of the 
deceased, there may be no assets to pay any potential award of attorney's fees. 
The deceased has not as of yet had to respond to the cross-appeal. Thus, there is no prejudice to 
the deceased in the withdrawal of the cross-appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial comi's award of attorney's fees should be upheld. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion is awarding attorney's fees to TVC and making both the deceased and counsel for the 
deceased jointly and severally liable for those attorney's fees. The trial court properly perceived 
the issue of attorney's fees as one of discretion. The trial court acted within the outer boundaries 
of its discretion and consistently with all legal standards applicable to specific choices. The trial 
court reached its decision by the exercise of reason. 
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SERVICE BY MAIL: The undersigned hereby certifies that two true bound copies hereof were 
this day mailed by U. S. Mail, postage prepaid to: Vernon K. Smith, Attorney at Law, at 1900 
West Main Street, Boise, ID 83702. 
DATED: JAN 2 1 2016 
SIGNED: 
Counsel for the defendants/respondents/cross-appellants 
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